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U-La-La, What’s Happened to Our California 
Right of Publicity? 
Eric Farber

 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1971, the California Legislature first enacted California Civil Code 
section 3344 to protect the economic interest of celebrities by banning the 
use of the name, likeness, voice and image of celebrities without authoriza-
tion.1  While the statute originally gave broad protection to the rights of ce-
lebrities (as well as non-celebrities) to protect the economic interest their 
fame generates, the courts have had to balance the broad rights of the sta-
tute against the interests of the First Amendment.2 
As the rights granted under section 3344 cross the powerful protec-
tions of the First Amendment, California‘s courts have limited the power of 
celebrities to control their own image and likeness as sometimes violative 
of the First Amendment‘s protections of free speech.3 
Because so many celebrities call California home, it has always been a 
leading proponent of the right of publicity.4  California codified the right of 
publicity through California Civil Code section 3344, as well as the post-
mortem right of publicity in California Civil Code section 3344.15.  Al-
though California‘s statutes are not the most liberal in their protections of 
celebrity rights, they are considered strong protectors of celebrity rights.6  
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 1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997). 
 2 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001); Kirby v. 
Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 608 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 3 See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 804. 
 4 See id. at 799–800 (discussing the protections regarding the right of publicity granted by the 
California Legislature and common law). 
 5 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 1997). 
 6 California is one of only a handful of states that recognize the right of publicity through statute 
(at last count, sixteen states have right of publicity statutes).  All states recognize the common law right 
of publicity.  George P. Smith II, The Extent of Protection of the Individual’s Personality Against 
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Cases interpreting the statute have consistently struggled to define the lim-
its of protection.7  Even with the strong protections granted by the statute, 
celebrities have had a difficult time overcoming the boundaries of the First 
Amendment in controlling and protecting their persona.8 
This article discusses the development of the history of the California 
right of publicity statutes through the analysis of three recent California 
cases.  These cases—Comedy III,9 Winter,10 and Kirby11—begin to define 
California courts‘ willingness to expand First Amendment protection 
against California‘s statutory right of publicity.  This article also discusses 
the theory of transformative elements and the role of the courts as the ―trier 
of fact‖ when deciding what is ―art‖ in these three landmark decisions.12 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STATUTE 
Section 3344 stems from the common law right of privacy, which pro-
tects a plaintiff against appropriation of his or her name or likeness for the 
defendant‘s advantage.13  Often the protection is considered to extend to 
one‘s ―persona.‖14  This not only protects a person‘s name and likeness, but 
also the public character or ―persona‖ they create.15  California continues to 
recognize the common law right of publicity, which section 3344 codifies 
and complements.16  The early language of the statute prescribed ―recovery 
of damages by any living person whose name, photograph, or likeness has 
been used for commercial purposes without his or her consent.‖17 
It was not until 1979, in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, that the Califor-
 
Commercial Use: Toward A New Property Right, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002).  Although California 
has an inherent interest because of the numbers of celebrities that reside there, other states, such as Indi-
ana and Tennessee, have stronger statutes to protect the rights of celebrities.  Alain J. Lapter, How the 
Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford—A Global Perspective on the Right of 
Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 264–66 (2007).  Indiana‘s interest springs from the presence 
of CMG Worldwide, which represents the rights to the Estates of Marilyn Monroe, James Dean, Babe 
Ruth and Princess Diana, while Tennessee is home to the Estate of Elvis Presley.  CMG Worldwide, 
Clients, http://www.cmgww.com/clients.html. 
 7 See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807 (―It is admittedly not a simple matter to develop a test that 
will unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic expression protected by the First Amendment and 
those that must give way to the right of publicity.‖). 
 8 See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 9 Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797. 
 10 Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
 11 Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607. 
 12 The title of this article is in reference to the Kirby case, the most recent of the above-mentioned 
cases.  As I will explain below, Kieran Kirby, the former lead singer of the band Deee-Lite, used the 
phrase, ―ooh-la-la‖ over and over in their most famous song, ―Groove is in the Heart.‖  Id. at 609.  The 
main character of Sega‘s game, Space Channel 5, was named, ―Ulala.‖  Id. at 609–10. 
 13 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2008) with Eastwood v. Sup. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 
346 (Ct. App. 1983).  See also William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 14 See Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 614. 
 15 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001). 
 16 Id. at 799. 
 17 Id. (emphasis added).  ―The statutory right originated in Civil Code section 3344, enacted in 
1971, authorizing recovery of damages by any living person whose name, photograph, or likeness has 
been used for commercial purposes without his or her consent.‖  Id. 
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nia Supreme Court recognized a common law right of publicity.18  Howev-
er, even then it was not recognized as a descendible right.19  In 1984, be-
cause neither the common law right of publicity nor section 3344 allowed 
for protection of deceased celebrities‘ rights of publicity, the legislature 
enacted California Civil Code section 990 (later changed to section 
3344.1), which protected the descendible rights of celebrities.20 
In 1984, the legislature made a significant change to 3344 and inserted 
the words, ―on or in products, merchandise, or goods.‖21  The legislature 
intended to expand the statute‘s protection for celebrities, but instead 
created an opportunity for the courts to more fully explore the statute‘s 
struggle against the First Amendment.22  The base language of the statute 
now reads: 
Any person who knowingly uses another‘s name, voice, signature, photograph, 
or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for pur-
poses of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, 
goods or services, without such person‘s prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, 
the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages 
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.23 
The shift away from strictly advertising purposes enhances the sta-
tute‘s entanglement with the First Amendment, as commercial speech rece-
ives inherently less protection than purely political speech, artistic expres-
sion or speech that is newsworthy.24  The legislature‘s change, which was 
intended to further protect celebrities from any use,25 increased the likelih-
ood that a court would magnify the First Amendment concerns when re-
viewing the statute. 
Under the original statute, ―for commercial purposes‖ established a 
line to which courts and practitioners could separate proper from improper 
appropriation of a celebrity‘s likeness.  Courts have always given their 
highest protections under the First Amendment to the press and newswor-
thy events, and less protection to commercial speech.26  For example, it was 
clear that the image of a celebrity could be used in a newspaper for educa-
tional use, or even to promote a newspaper.27  However, using a celebrity‘s 
image as a commercial endorsement or print ad without their authorization 
 
 18 603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 1979). 
 19 Id. at 429. 
 20 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2008); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799-800. 
 21 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 801 (emphasis added). 
 22 See id. 
 23 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2008) (emphasis added). 
 24 See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 614 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding that ―[First 
Amendment] protections may extend to all forms of expression, including written and spoken words 
(fact or fiction), music, films, painting, and entertainment, whether or not sold for a profit.‖). 
 25 See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 801. 
 26 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980).  See 
also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between the 
use of athletic statistics in news and advertizing contexts). 
 27 See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
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was most certainly a violative use.28 
The early right of publicity cases reviewed the basic threshold issues 
for protection under the statute.  The court did not find in favor of Joe 
Montana in his case against the San Jose Mercury News for using a photo-
graph of Montana in a poster to promote the newspaper.29  Even though the 
use by the San Jose Mercury News was actually a promotional tool to in-
crease circulation, the event depicted was newsworthy in and of itself.30  It 
stands as a clear example of the overriding concern the court has for the 
freedom of the press and the heightened level of protection granted to the 
press.  While the Ninth Circuit dismissed the statutory claims of Vanna 
White when Samsung used a blond-headed robot to turn letters during a 
commercial promoting one of its products, the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
common law right of publicity because there was a triable issue of fact.31  
In contrast to the pure commercial nature of promoting a product through 
television commercials, the Montana and White cases are good examples 
that the First Amendment affords protection for use of a celebrity‘s likeness 
to promote a newspaper‘s archival records (newsworthy protection). 
Since the initial round of cases, such as the Montana and White cases, 
the courts have had to struggle with the intersection of celebrity rights and 
the First Amendment in situations that are 
more difficult to define. 
II.  SADERUP, WINTER, AND KIRBY 
The first case in which the Supreme Court 
of California developed the theory of ―trans-
formative elements‖ to establish the First Amendment boundaries for the 
right of publicity was Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.32  In 
Comedy III, charcoal sketch artist Gary Saderup created his artistic render-
ing of The Three Stooges, which he then sold to the public as lithographic 
T-shirts.33  Comedy III Productions, the owner of the rights of publicity of 
Moe, Jerome ―Curly‖ Howard, and Larry Fein—collectively known as The 
Three Stooges—sued to enjoin the sale of the lithographs and T-shirts as 
well as to collect damages and attorney‘s fees.34  Saderup defended the case 
to the United States Supreme Court, which denied review.35  Saderup ad-
vanced two separate defenses: (1) that his conduct did not violate the terms 
of section 3341.1; and (2) that his actions were protected by the First 
 
 28 See Cher v. Forum Int‘l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 29 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 30 Id. at 640–41. 
 31 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 32 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
 33 Id. at 800. 
 34 Id. at 800–01. 
 35 Id., cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). 
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Amendment.36  The court found neither argument persuasive.37 
The court first addressed Saderup‘s argument that the use of the image 
in the lithographs and on T-shirts was not within the statute.38  He con-
tended that the statute applied only to the use of a deceased personality‘s 
name, voice, photograph or image for the purpose of advertising, selling, or 
soliciting the purchase of products or services.39  The court focused on the 
language, ―in any manner‖ in ruling that his argument was simply ―unper-
suasive.‖40  The court found that the lithographs and T-shirts themselves 
were tangible personal property, which satisfied the requirements of the 
statute.41  The court clarified that, while the original sketch itself was pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the lithograph copies and T-shirts were 
violative.42 
The second argument moved the court away from simple interpreta-
tion of the statute toward a balancing of the boundaries of the right of pub-
licity against the protections of the First Amendment.43  Political speech, 
use by the press, or artistic expression require pure or enhanced protection 
by the First Amendment.44  The entanglement of the First Amendment and 
celebrity rights emerges when there is a product involved.45  Although 
commercial speech is not entitled to the same level of protection as pure 
non-commercial speech, it is still entitled to the protection of the First 
Amendment.46  The introduction of a product, such as the lithographs and 
T-shirts in Comedy III, introduces the question of whether or not Saderup‘s 
motives were purely for commercial gain or actually for artistic motives.47  
There is no question that Saderup created a piece of artwork in the original 
sketched image and, as stated earlier, the original drawing is not a violation 
of the statute.  The question with which the Comedy III court was faced 
was whether the transfer of the sketch to the lithographs and T-shirts and 
their subsequent sales violated the statute. 
Section 3344.1 gives protection to original works of art.48  But what 
happens when the original work is reproduced for sale without permission 
of the celebrity subject for sale to the general public?  To decide this, the 
court developed the transformative elements test.49  The Comedy III court 
stated that, in order to evoke the protection of the First Amendment, the 
 
 36 Id. at 801. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 801–02. 
 39 Id. at 801. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 802. 
 42 Id. at 801. 
 43 Id. at 802–11. 
 44 Id. at 809. 
 45 Id. at 802. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 810. 
 48 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(a)(2) (West 2008). 
 49 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
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court must look to the actual creation to determine what extent the work is 
―transformative.‖50  But what exactly is, ―transformative?‖  In its most ex-
plainable form, a work is transformative when it has elements the artist has 
added that give ―significant expression‖ beyond the original work.51  In 
these cases, the ―original work‖ is really that of the image or ―likeness of 
the celebrity.‖52  The Comedy III court refused First Amendment protec-
tion.53 
Saderup failed to create a work that was uniquely his.  His reproduc-
tions were nothing more than a literal rendering of the Three Stooges in 
charcoal.54  The California Supreme Court said that the literal rendering 
failed to have any transformative elements from the original image of the 
celebrity and, without that, the First Amendment defense simply does not 
apply.55  Saderup simply did not do enough to add his own artistic vision to 
the drawing of the Three Stooges. 
Many artists, especially those out of the sixties‘ pop art movement, 
used celebrities as the subject of their art.  Andy 
Warhol‘s portraits of Marilyn Monroe, Chairman 
Mao, and James Dean are examples of popular 
culture lending itself to art.56  Certainly, Warhol 
(or his estate) can sell recreations of ―Marilyn‖ 
without having to pay royalties or even get per-
mission from Marilyn Monroe‘s estate.  The 
age of Marilyn has enough transformative quali-
ties to it that it is known as an important work by 
Warhol and famous as a Warhol work, rather than simply as an image of 
Marilyn Monroe.57  Although there is little doubt that Warhol‘s intent was 
not only to create art but to earn money, it does not appear that his imme-
diate goal was to put the paintings on T-shirts for sale. 
Although Warhol is an excellent example of a famous artist, a less 
famous artist is not left out of the analysis under Comedy III, requiring only 
transformative elements to relieve an artist from the grasp of the celebrity‘s 
rights.58  However, a jury of twelve could have ruled differently.  The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, by reviewing the case without remand, acted as the 
curator of the museum to decide whether or not there was a significant 
enough transformation to give Saderup‘s work First Amendment protection 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. at 808. 
 52 Id. at 809. 
 53 Id. at 810. 
 54 Id. at 801. 
 55 Id. at 811. 
 56 Zeke Quezada, Press Release, About.com, Andy Warhol: The Celebrity Portraits, http:// 
govegas.about.com/cs/familyfun/a/warhol.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Celebrity Por-
traits]. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808. 
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as a serious work of art.  It is this author‘s opinion that, although the ―art‖ 
that Saderup created was woefully short of transformative elements, his 
clear intention to simply sell T-shirts should have played a more pivotal 
role in the court‘s analysis.  If Saderup had created a one of a kind drawing, 
which then hung on a museum wall for a number of years and achieved its 
own fame as a work of art, it is extremely unlikely that the court would 
have reached the same conclusion. 
Although the right of publicity won the battle against the First 
Amendment in Comedy III, the California Supreme Court‘s transformative 
elements test set the stage for a First Amendment takeover.  The case of 
Winter v. DC Comics was the first to truly interpret the rule developed by 
the Comedy III court.59  In Winter, the Winter brothers, Johnny and Edgar, 
a long-time singing duo with distinct long white 
hair and extremely fair skin, sued DC Comics for 
the publication of Jonah Hex.60  Jonah Hex was a 
five volume comic series featuring the Autumn 
Brothers, a pair of half snake, half human killers 
named Johnny and Edgar.61  Both carried wea-
pons—one a pistol, the other a rifle—and were evil 
characters.62 
Fig. 1  The Autumn Brothers of Jonah Hex 
Fig. 2  Johnny Winter     Fig. 3  Edgar Winter 
 
 59 69 P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. 2003). 
 60 Id. at 476. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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The Winter brothers sued DC Comics for misappropriation of their 
right of publicity for basing the Autumn Brothers characters on them.63  DC 
Comics defended on First Amendment grounds and won summary judg-
ment in the trial court.64  The court of appeal originally affirmed the trial 
court‘s grant of summary judgment for DC Comics, but, on instruction 
from the California Supreme Court, reversed its decision and remanded, 
stating that there were triable issues of fact which existed with regard to 
California Civil Code section 3344.65  Interestingly, Winter‘s first visit to 
the supreme court was delayed because of the Comedy III decision, which 
the court decided first.66 
In the second round, the court of appeal affirmed summary judgment 
on all counts except misappropriation under California Civil Code section 
3344 and remanded the case to the trial court.67  DC Comics petitioned the 
California Supreme Court to review the matter again for determination that 
the use, as a matter of law, was not a misappropriation of the Winters‘ like-
nesses.68 
The supreme court, in its first right of publicity decision since Comedy 
III, granted review.69  The court specifically addressed the economic issue 
inherent in section 3344, stating that the rights conveyed by the statute are 
economic.70  Addressing the issue much like claims under the Lanham 
Act,71 the court looked at the monopolization of the celebrity‘s likeness by 
the owner.72  The celebrity can still ―monopolize the production of conven-
tional, more or less fungible, images of the celebrity‖ with regards to me-
morabilia.73  However, when the creation contains ―significant transforma-
tive elements‖ that remove it from the general economic crossover that may 
be found in celebrity memorabilia, the defendant is entitled to First 
Amendment protection because it is less likely to interfere with the eco-
nomic interests that the statute is designed to protect.74  The court posed the 
question of whether or not the DC Comics creation of Jonah Hex was 
something with which the Winter brothers should be economically con-
cerned.75 
The obvious challenge that courts must face is to define, ―significant 
transformative elements.‖  In doing so, Winter looked to the language of 
 
 63 Id.  The Winter Brothers also filed suit for defamation, which is not discussed here.  Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 477–78. 
 71 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2000). 
 72 Winter, 69 P.3d at 477–78. 
 73 Id. at 477. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 478. 
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Comedy III: ―[E]xpression of something other than the likeness of the cele-
brity . . . .‖76 and ―[a]n artist depicting a celebrity must contribute some-
thing more than a ‗merely trivial‘ variation, but must create something re-
cognizably ‗his own‘ in order to qualify for legal protection.‖77  The court 
continued: ―[W]hen an artist‘s skill and talent is manifestly subordinated to 
the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so as to 
commercially exploit his or her fame, then the artist‘s right of free expres-
sion is outweighed by the right of publicity.‖78  The court continued to ex-
plore the transformative elements added by the artist, whether or not the 
work was worthy of First Amendment protections due to the artist‘s contri-
bution to the celebrity‘s likeness, and to what extent the new work‘s eco-
nomic interest is furthered by the involvement of the celebrity.79 
The supreme court held in favor of DC Comics, determining that the 
economic interests of the Winter Brothers were not infringed when 
weighed against the interests of the First Amendment.80  The court sug-
gested that the use by DC Comics was not one with which the Winter 
brothers should be concerned, because the brothers were a singing duo who 
likely would not have an economic interest in a comic book and whose par-
ticular fans do not really care about them in cartoon form.81 
However, as further discussed below, the court should not simply be 
looking at whether or not the fans should care, as the publicity right is, and 
should be, based on the origination of the likeness.  The Winter brothers 
should be allowed to control their likeness and decide where, when, and 
how it can be used.  Where it came from, how it was imagined and who 
should control that use is a key pillar of the right of publicity that the courts 
are now retreating from in the face of the First Amendment. 
The court addressed this case using the First Amendment argument 
based on the transformative nature of the work.82  And, in this instance, the 
court, stepping in as the trier of fact, concluded that the work was entitled 
to First Amendment protection.83  The court could have put before the jury 
the questions: (1) whether the work was a transformative use of the Win-
ters‘ images; and (2) whether the intent of DC Comics was to merely capi-
talize on the fame and persona of the Winter brothers as a vehicle to draw 
prospective readers.  Looking to commercial intent, in addition to the trans-
formative elements, creates a more complete analysis to decide the question 
of whether or not there is an economic misappropriation.  The issue of 
whether or not this infringed on the economic interests could have been put 
 
 76 Id. (quoting Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001)). 
 77 Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797). 
 78 Id. (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 480. 
 81 Id. at 479. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
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to a jury.  In this author‘s opinion, the court was not incorrect in its finding 
because of the significant level of transformative elements; however, in 
cases that are less certain, the court‘s ruling as a matter of law causes strain 
on the transformative elements test. 
In Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., a California appellate court was 
called on to review another case involving transformative elements.84  Kie-
rin Kirby was the lead singer of the early 1990‘s band, Deee-Lite.85  She 
performed as lead of the band with great devotion as a character she devel-
oped, ―Lady Miss Kier.‖86  Kirby‘s celebrity and public persona was based 
more on her fame from Deee-Lite and as Lady Miss Kier than anything 
else.87  Lady Miss Kier had a distinctive style that Kirby is still known for 
today, combining retro and fu-
turistic looks with signature 
platform shoes, knee-socks, 
unitards, short pleated skirts 
(generally plaid), and sporting 
a bare midriff and backpack.88  
Kirby also claims the lyrical 
expression ―ooh-la-la‖, which 
she sings in Deee-Lite‘s most 
popular song, ―Groove is in 
the Heart.‖89  Although Kirby 
had not put out an album, with 
or without Deee-Lite, in many 
years, she maintained a dis-
tinct following for Lady Miss 
Kier.90 
Enter Sega.91  Sometime 
between 1997 and 1999 an 
employee from Sega Japan created Space Channel 5, a video game targeted 
to teenage girls.92  Space Channel 5‘s main character was Ulala, a female 
reporter who is dispatched to investigate aliens who are invading Earth by 
causing uncontrollable dancing.93  Ulala was outfitted with several different 
costumes throughout the game, but was primarily seen in a miniskirt, el-
bow-length gloves, stiletto-healed knee-high platform boots and hot pink 
 
 84 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Ct. App. 2006) 
 85 Id. at 609. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Sega was not the only defendant in the case.  Id. at 611.  THQ and AGETEC were also defen-
dant parties.  Id.  THQ as a licensee for the handheld version of the game for Nintendo and AGETEC 
for their license to distribute for the Playstation platform.  Id. at 610. 
 92 Id. at 609. 
 93 Id. at 610. 
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hair tied in two dramatic ponytails.94 
After Sega had released the game in several formats, Sega contem-
plated using the Deee-Lite song, ―Groove is in the Heart‖ to promote the 
game.  They even contacted Kirby to see if she, as Lady Miss Kier, would 
promote the game.95  She refused and, in 2003, sued Sega for infringement 
of the common law right of publicity, violation of California Civil Code 
section 3344, violation of the Lanham Act, unfair competition and interfe-
rence with prospective economic advantage.96 
Sega moved the court for summary judgment on two grounds.  First, 
Sega argued that Kirby failed to meet all of the elements required for her 
claims.97  Additionally, Sega asserted that the First Amendment was a 
complete defense to the action.98  Under the appellate court‘s analysis, it is 
apparent that the first part of Sega‘s defense was simply not necessary.  
The trial court had found that material factual issues existed as to whether 
Sega had misappropriated Kirby‘s likeness by their creation of the Ulala 
character, and the appellate court agreed.99  There were material issues of 
fact whether Ulala was based on Kirby under both common law and sta-
tute.100  However, the court stated that it was unnecessary to carry the anal-
ysis that far, as the First Amendment was a complete defense to Kirby‘s 
claims.101 
The court, immediately citing Comedy III and Winter, looked to the 
transformative elements and inquired whether ―the defendant‘s work ‗adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the 
first with new expression, meaning, or message.‘‖102  The court further 
stated that the transformative nature of the work would make it ―less likely 
to interfere with the economic interests protected by the right of publici-
ty.‖103  The court, in reaching its decision, did not give any weight to the 
fact that Sega approached Kirby to endorse the game prior to its release.104  
As such, the court completely ignored Sega‘s commercial intent when 
creating the Ulala character. 
Kirby insisted that the Ulala character was, indeed, her, simply with 
―digital enhancements and manipulations.‖105  The court did not agree with 
this argument and felt that Kirby and the Ulala character, although they 
shared similarities, had sufficiently different hairstyles, clothing, look, and 
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even dance moves.106  The court, despite Kirby‘s insistence, refused to re-
ject the transformative elements test and reaffirmed Comedy III‘s analy-
sis.107  Although it certainly could be argued that Kirby based her own cha-
racter, Lady Miss Kier on Japanese anime style and is, therefore, not 
entitled to any protection because it was not developed by her, the character 
that she developed is clearly entitled to protection under both the common 
law and statutory right of publicity, at least to some extent.  The court did 
address the similarities between Lady Miss Kier and Ulala and dismissed 
them by simply stating that, although there were some similarities, Sega‘s 
actions were protected by the First Amendment due to the transformative 
elements that were present.108 
Should jurists really be determining what is ―art‖?  None of the three 
cases discussed here, although stating that the transformative elements test 
is a factual question, actually allowed a jury—or even a trial court judge—
to make the determination, as each was decided by a panel.109  The Kirby 
court‘s application of the transformative elements test, which left out the 
actual balance in the economic interest as enunciated in Comedy III, may 
have led to an inconsistent result.  It is unknown whether a jury would have 
decided the fate of Lady Miss Kier the same as the appellate court panel.110 
CONCLUSION 
The rulings from the above three cases are interesting from more than 
simply a legal perspective.  The rulings affect our popular culture and the 
money derived from our popular culture.  The rights protected by section 
3344 are, as defined by the courts, economic rights and the right to control 
the economic aspects of a celebrity‘s persona and the economic interest the 
celebrity built in to that persona.111  According to the courts, a bit of tweak-
ing here and there to the image or likeness or the name may allow an ―un-
authorized‖ artist to capitalize on that persona.112  Without something more, 
the transformative elements test is incomplete.  The court must also look to 
the commercial intent of the defendant.  If we look at the facts of the three 
cases on a use scale that combines the transformative elements, as well as 
the commercial nature or intent of the defendant, the court could give better 
direction as to what is violative of the First Amendment.  Comedy III was 
essentially a direct copy of a basic image of the Three Stooges and con-
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 110 One can judge for oneself.  A montage of Lady Miss Kier and Ulala has been assembled on 
YouTube.  Who Came First—Ulala or Lady Kier?, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pyI75Wd8ug 
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verted into a charcoal drawing for the specific intent of selling T-shirts.113  
This is a clear violation of the economic interest of the celebrity.  There is 
little question that this level of use should be stopped.  On the other end of 
the scale is the Winter case, where the use has little intent and is highly 
transformative.  The characters developed by DC Comics had little, if any-
thing, to do with the Winter brothers, other than some basic level of inspi-
ration as to their overall look of the caricature.114  There was little to do 
with the public persona that Winter brothers had established.  Further, the 
creation of a comic book, which many consider art in a form similar to 
movies or television, would be entitled to a higher level of protection.  
Combining the two analyses would give a more defined result. 
Carefully viewing the commercial intent could lead to a different con-
clusion in Kirby.  Keiran Kirby (or, as she was better known to the public, 
Lady Miss Kier) was clearly more than simple inspiration for the Ulala 
character in the Sega video game.  Her hair, clothes, backpack, and overall 
style were almost identical to the video game character.  Further, Sega went 
so far as to contact her to promote the game.115  Sega‘s intent could be 
looked at as attempting to further connect the two characters.  Despite these 
obvious connections, the obvious inspiration, and the clear recognition of 
the character to Lady Miss Kier to the Sega character, the court blocked her 
attempt at the misappropriation claim by simply stating that the elements to 
the character were transformed enough to be protected by the First 
Amendment—without having a jury make that decision.116  Sega‘s com-
mercial intent is slightly less clear.  We know that Sega attempted to have 
Kirby and her band‘s song to promote the game.117  The persona that Sega 
used could be argued to be for the purpose of selling more video games.  A 
jury balancing these elements together could clearly render a different re-
sult. 
Paying attention to the commercial nature in addition to the ―trans-
formative use‖ certainly assists the trier of fact in its determination.  What 
is the actual difference between White and Kirby?  In White, White‘s per-
sona was transformed into a robot that turned letters on a board, an action 
that was very similar to her day job.118  The robot was specifically used to 
sell through a television commercial.119  In Kirby, the use was a video 
game.  Ulala was arguably based on Kirby to attract the specific demo-
graphic to which Kirby appealed.  Therefore, Sega used the persona to ca-
pitalize on the demographic and fan base that Kirby built, thus heightening 
the commercial nature of their use.  Leaving out the commercial nature of 
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the analysis can severely damage the rights the statutes are designed to pro-
tect.  The Winter court did address the economic right but quickly dis-
missed the Winter brothers‘ claim that DC Comics had impaired such right 
by stating that transformative works, especially those that are worthy of 
First Amendment protection, are less likely to interfere with the economic 
interest protected by the right of publicity.120  Further, the court asserted 
that the statute‘s purpose is to protect the celebrity‘s economic right, i.e., 
the right to distribute its own memorabilia.121  This approach leaves out 
what celebrity has truly become to our pop culture. 
America has been dominating the market on celebrity culture since be-
fore the first frame of film was shot in Hollywoodland in the late 1800‘s.  
Through the 1800‘s, showman wrestlers, circus performers, and boxers 
were known wherever there were newspapers—not just in America, but 
worldwide.  Certainly, P.T. Barnham was one of the first to control the 
economic right and capitalize on the fame of a celebrity. 
Just as the world focuses our collective attention on the celebrity, the 
celebrity focuses its attention on trying to exploit and monetize it—as is its 
right.  The right of the celebrity to control its economic rights is bounded 
only by the tenets of the First Amendment.122  As the Kirby case shows us, 
Sega, with a far greater ability to reach millions of people than Lady Miss 
Keir ever could, has stumbled onto a new outlet for exploiting the fame of a 
celebrity apart from the celebrity‘s own rights.  Just as Sega developed a 
game—arguably based on the persona of Lady Miss Kier—one can im-
agine a game based on two debutante sisters, both tall, thin and attractive, 
who have to save the world by attending parties and driving in convertible 
Bentleys.  One could also imagine a game based on an Austrian bodybuild-
er who must build an empire on his way to becoming a top politician.  In 
recognition of the recent decisions and the light standard that the court has 
now set to earn First Amendment protection, creators and artists could 
create characters truly based on celebrities without their permission or au-
thorization as long as it is transformed enough from the literal image of the 
celebrity. 
Allowing First Amendment protection based solely on considerations 
of transformative elements, without recognition of commercial intent, cir-
cumvents too much of the statute‘s protections.  As discussed above, Andy 
Warhol often used celebrities as the subject of his work.123  However, War-
hol‘s dominant motive was not simply to sell T-shirts or lithographs or vid-
eo games bearing his creation.  His dominant motive was to actually create 
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a work of art.  Warhol uses celebrities as the focus of his work to show us 
just how celebrity-driven our culture is.  However, regardless of the mo-
tive, his works became known more as the work of Warhol than the cele-
brities they depicted.  They were not literal depictions and certainly had 
―transformative elements,‖ but in many cases there was little difference be-
tween the work he created and a literal image of the celebrity.  The Marilyn 
Monroe painting is a good example of this.  There is no question that the 
painted image is simply Marilyn in a distorted color pattern.  However, the 
painting became known as an artistic work by Warhol, rather than simply 
an image of Marilyn. 
Even if the painting was by a different artist, as long as the artist‘s 
rendition becomes known for its own merit apart from the celebrity it no 
longer infringes on the celebrity‘s economic interests.  A Warhol effect, so 
to speak.  If Saderup‘s sketch of the Three Stooges had become famous on 
its own, it would be difficult for the court to stop Saderup‘s commercializa-
tion of the sketch. 
The Winter court discussed the Winter brothers‘ lack of exploitation in 
the comic book market.124  However, as our culture has an ever-growing 
fascination with ―celebrity,‖ and with the amazing avenues a celebrity and 
its team of advisors can use to exploit its fame, celebrities should have the 
right to pursue any and all avenues.  The right of publicity should protect 
all avenues for the celebrity, whether a particular judge believes they can 
be exploited or not.  Clothing lines, bottled waters, luggage lines, sun-
glasses, sunscreens . . . how about a line of Nicole Ritchie baby care books 
. . . or Brett Favre hand warmers . . . are all commercial and are more ob-
vious economic interests.  It is not hard to imagine a comic book series 
starring Jessica Simpson and her boyfriend-of-the-moment.  Should she not 
have the right to exploit that economic interest? 
The courts‘ failure to look beyond the sketch, the image, or the digi-
tized version is likely to further the misuse of celebrity name and likeness.  
Courts should instead look to the dominant motive and the strength of the 
artwork itself, and the notoriety it has gained on its own. 
It is unlikely that we will see legions of unauthorized Arnold Schwar-
zenegger copies in digitized form for a video game without his name or 
voice, which would be protected under the statute.  If the theory of trans-
formative elements is followed, however, without consideration of the 
commercial intent, commercialization of celebrities‘ images, without au-
thorization for a myriad of uses, will continue to be viable.  A court must 
also take into consideration the intent of the defendant along with the trans-
formative elements to form a more complete test to protect both the right of 
publicity and First Amendment guarantees. 
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